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Preface
The topic ofmy thesis is transfer pricing. Previous research that I completed in this
area focused on how Swedish law tries to prevent "hidden income transactions", one of
the problems of transfer pricing. These types of transactions occur when a company
offers special prices or benefits to another company that shares a mutual economic
interest. This can greatly affect government revenue in the form of lost taxes. Corrective
measures taken by governments can help to regulate agreement terms between
companies that have a mutual economic interest. Ideally, business conducted between
two (or more) economically related companies is conducted with an "arms length"
distance between them. That is, they should conduct business using the same market
prices as they offer to other companies not sharing their interests.
Government tax authorities must be especially mindful of the transactions
occurring in multinational companies because of the risk that transfer pricing will move
profits from one country to another. The EU countries usually follow guidelines set by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) when
determining the market or "arms length" prices. Although the United States is a member
of the OECD, it has opted not to use these same guidelines. This is because the US uses a
global, profit-related method to determine the correct rate of taxation instead of using a
transaction-related method.
IV
The structure of my paper will begin with a general discussion of transfer pricing,
followed by an explanation of the OECD Guidelines. The second main body of my thesis
will deal with the U.S. transfer pricing regulations. The third part of my thesis will look
at the European perspective on transfer pricing, especially from the United Kingdom's
point of view. Finally I will make an attempt to point out the differences between Europe
and the U.S. and the conflicts that exists. For example, the UK is an old seafaring nation,
which takes a businesslike approach to arm's-length and transfer pricing. The U.S. on the
other hand attempts to collect maximum tax regardless of compliance costs and applies
the arm's length criteria on a very complex methodology. The majority of the transfers
pricing cases in the world are therefore litigated in the U.S.
Section 482 of the IRC authorizes the IRS to adjust the income, deductions, credits
or allowances of commonly controlled taxpayers in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect their income. The application of the section to multinational operations
may include a wide range of issues: If a domestic distribution subsidiary buys goods
from its foreign parent for resale to unrelated parties, what is the appropriate profit? Or,
if a foreign subsidiary uses a patent belonging to its U.S. parent, how much royalty
should the subsidiary pay for the use of the intangible asset?
Finally, what is the future likely to be when discussing transfer pricing? Is a
formula approach preferable to the arm's-length standard? Should all multinationals be
concerned about transfer pricing? In that case, which kinds of businesses are most
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Transfer pricing is one of the principal international taxation issues of the 1990s
and potentially of future decades as well. For corporate enterprises, it can be difficult
enough to do business in just one countr}'. but it gets even more complex when the>' go
international. The growth of multinational enterprises (MNEs) creates complex taxation
issues for both the tax administrations as well for the MNE. Not only do MNEs have to
prepare several tax filings, they also have to struggle with another complication: transfer
pricing. And this does not affect only the big multinationals. As long as a company has
facilities in more than one taxing jurisdiction, it must be aware of this issue. Even if the
management does not consider that one facilit\' is "selling" goods or services to another,
it is most likely that the tax authorities will adopt that view.
'
Transfer pricing concerns allocation of income earned within affiliated corporate
groups in different countries, which must satisfy tax authorities that they are not evading
taxes through the use of transfer pricing. Due to the fundamental change in international
business over the last 30 years, it is estimated today that over 60% of cross-border trade
is between related parties.^ The corporation must show that its transfer prices resemble
the price that would arise in arm's-length negotiations between unrelated firms.
An associated enterprise is an enterprise that meets the conditions set forth in
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Namely, if one of the enterprises
' Journal of Accountancy, vol. 186, No. 1.
' Borstell, Transfer Pricing - An International Guide, International Tax Review, at 3 (1997).
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participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of the other or if
the enterprises are under common control by the same persons/
As will be shown below, there are several different methods for calculating the
arm's-length price. The effort to convince each countr\' that the profits disclosed locally
are "fair" is often a lengthy, and not always successful, process. If the corporation fails to
do that - the result could be double taxation as well as penalties on taxes the tax
authorities consider to be underpaid. The main problem with transfer pricing occurs
when the transactions are not properh- identified and analyzed. As a result, this will often
lead to complex, lengthy, and expensive inquiries and litigation."*
Although not a new subject, the recent revisions to the OECD report on transfer
pricing and the final US Section 482 regulations on the topic (particularly the related
penalty rules) has intensified the international debate on transfer pricing methods and
their acceptability. For example, in the UK, the Inland Revenue's International Division
is verv- active. They seek to bring transfer pricing rules directly into play in the
forthcoming self-assessment regime for companies.
Electronics and pharmaceutical companies need to be particularly alert to transfer
pricing initiatives. One reason for this is the profit potential of this kind of industry: there
is a big tax base just waiting to be taxed. Another reason is that the taxing authorities
often believe that "mistakes' have been made when setting the "right* price, because of
the competition and fast moving end user prices in these kind of businesses. They doubt
^ OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, at P-3
(1997).
^ Pagan, Transfer Pricing Strategy in a Global Economy, at 1 7 (1993).
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that companies will have devoted enough resources to documenting transfer pricing
policies in a manner that will give the company a good defense on audit/
However, transfer pricing policies are not just about taxation but about company
management behavior as well. If a bonus is paid in relation to operating profits, a change
in policy may have a negative impact on efficiency. Another issue is indirect taxes in the
area of customs duty liability.
Given all the above, the transfer pricing policies of multinationals are being
considered in a totally new light by the tax authorities, who are also using new methods
and improved knowledge to audit prior years. This situation applies to all multinationals.
One should keep in mind that the taxing authorities see the multinationals as a "soft
target' of potentially taxable income.^
A. The History of Transfer Pricing
The history of transfer pricing provisions goes back to the time of World War I.
Because of the War, taxes had been increased, and the authorities were eager to prevent
tax avoidance by the device of manipulating prices, especially with overseas associates.
The first country to enact legislation was the United Kingdom in 1915, followed by the
United States a couple of years later. The initial role of this legislation, however, was
more preventative than operational. Thereafter, not much happened in this field until the
mid-1960s, when international trade and investments substantially increased.^
* Collins, International Transfer Pricing in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry, at 15 (1993).
^ Coopers & Lybrand, International Transfer Pricing 1997-1998, at 3 (1997).
^ Pagan, at 17.
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In the 1 970s the developed countries (with high taxes) had problems keeping their tax
base in light of the shifting of income to lower tax jurisdictions. Governments and tax
authorities then began to attack the increasing use of tax havens, and they developed
expertise in these issues. But transfer pricing was the final backup provision, when
simpler provisions did not apply. It was an area widely disregarded by politics and with
almost no reference to economic analysis.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) made its first
in-depth analysis of the problem with transfer pricing in two reports in 1979 and 1984.'°
The Reports favored the arm's-length method and rejected the approach of global
apportionment. There was full agreement between the major trading nations that the
transfer price had to be determined based on one of three transactional methods: the
comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, and the cost plus
method.''
In the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. recognized that it was not the economic superpower
of the world anymore. U.S. MNEs expanded overseas often moving manufacturing to
areas with lower costs and transferring ownership of valuable intangibles to low-tax
jurisdictions. The U.S. had a problem in preserving its tax base. The government found it
easier to increase the tax take from foreign companies (non-voters) and the result was a
tightening of the existing US transfer pricing rules.
In 1986 Section 482 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) was amended to include the
commensurate-with-income standard. In 1988 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the
* Pagan, at 1 8.
^Borstell, at3.
'° See chapter III.
" Borstell, at 3.
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White Paper gave birth to profit-based Xvansfer pricing methods in calculating the arm's-
length price. In 1994 the fmal transfer pricing regulations to Section 482 were issued
followed by the regulations on cost sharing in 1995. The U.S. rules are controversial
since they represent a consideration of company results, instead of prices. They also
adopt a mechanical, statistical approach to the arm's-length standard, disregarding any
individual facts and circumstances in a specific transaction.'^
Recently, the multinationals have begun to actively manage their transfer pricing
policies, and revenue authorities are responding to the more aggressive stance on transfer
pricing issues taken by the U.S. In 1995 the OECD was more or less provoked into
rewriting its work on transfer pricing.''*
B. What is Transfer Pricing?
What does the term transfer pricing mean? The term relates to how entities in a
multinational enterprise (MNE) price the sale of goods, amounts charged for services,
and the use of intangible assets between themselves. These can include management fees,
royalties charged for the use of technology, patents or know-how, royalties for the use of
computer software, and amounts charged for the use of trademarks.
The prices paid, of course, are initially a matter for the enterprise. The term transfer
price is employed to separate them from prices paid in the open market. Accordingly, the
'- Borstell, at 4.
^* Coopers, at 4. Transfer Pricing Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (July
1995, updated March 1996 and August and September 1997).
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term transfer price is a neutral term. It does not mean a pricing decision by a MNE to
shift income from one entity to another within the group.''
If goods etc. are underpriced. the buyer will make more profit at the expense of the
seller. If the same transaction is overpriced, it will be the opposite situation. The
profitability of the MNE as a whole will not be affected. It is the profit of the individual
companies that is shifted one way or the other. However, when the companies are
situated in different countries, the tax base of one country will be less than it ought to be.
The result is that the MNE could choose the level of taxation in a country by adjusting
the pricing mechanism.'^ Transfer pricing is a way of providing a contribution to the
various entities in the enterprise as a compensation for their part of the production or sale
of goods or service.
Where transfer pricing is concerned, there is no major difference if the enterprise is a
multinational, transnational, or binational involved in international operations. Despite
the degree of integration, the transactions will be similar in the different countries. The
term MNE will therefore be used for the ease of reading throughout.'
C. What are the Risks?
As mentioned above, revenue authorities in the developed countries are nowadays
much more alert and aggressive when it comes to transfer pricing. Since there is a
discrepancy in how to determine the 'right' transfer price, many companies decide to pay
'^Collins, at 71.
'* Pagan, at 15.
"Mat 25.
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the extra tax instead of entering into a costly dispute. The main rislcs for the company,
which does not plan its transfer prices, are:
• double taxation,
• increased local tax liability,
• penalties and interest on overdue tax.'^
As if this were not enough, the corporation will battle against uncertainty as to the
group's worldwide tax burden and problems in the relationships with local tax
authorities. Another issue with respect to domestic legislation is the different attitudes
towards the transfer pricing provisions. Even though similar legislation may exist in two
countries, the application can differ greatly. It may seem to be two totally different
systems, just because of the way in which the tax authorities apply the law on a facts and
circumstances basis.
1. Planning
Most multinationals share the same views on the general approach of tax authorities
to transfer pricing. What a MNE wants to avoid is the double taxation of income and
profits. How do they do that? The key is planning. A careful planning for transfer pricing
gives the MNE a chance to consider implications other than direct taxation. It is also a
perfect opportunity to gather information about the business that may otherwise go
urmoticed. But the transfer pricing policy must be kept up to date, every time the
business of the MNE is organized or at least every six months.'^ The policy should
'* Coopers, at 3.
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involve financial, tax and operational personnel. This provides an opportunity for the
companies within the MNE to communicate about their positions and priorhies.
2. How to deal with the Tax Authorities
One problem for the MNE when dealing with the tax authorities is to change their
thinking, from the national to the global level. The tax authorities are mostly preoccupied
in establishing profit with respect to an individual transaction, but the commercial
thinking of the MNE is global and more concerned about consolidated results.^^ The
approach of the tax authorities varies a great deal in different jurisdictions. In the
developing countries transfer pricing is not that often the main issue for review. Foreign
exchange control and withholding taxes are usually the principal focus for purposes of
the revenue controls.^'
However, particularly in the U.S., a complex framework of extensive resources and
procedures are established to help the authorities in their investigations. This aggressive
US approach is forcing other countries to match their extensive resources and to adopt
clearer rules on the subject. As we will see further on, the tax authorities are gradually
increasing their resources and experience in this area, becoming more and more
sophisticated in their approach as well as in selecting commercial relationships for
investigation. The MNE has to decide whether to respond in a passive manner or to take
a proactive approach to the audit process.
^° Pagan, at 27.
"' Coopers, at 119.
"Mat 120.
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The most important thing is to get control over the audit process. Instead of being
unprepared for handing over information, the MNE must devote appropriate resources
for this process. Both tax administrators and the MNE usually have problems in finding
adequate information since it may be incomplete or difficult to interpret. For reasons of
confidentiality it may even be impossible to obtain information from an independent
enterprise."''
Another important consideration is to minimize the exposure that may be the result of
the audit. Tax returns for prior years should be finalized and agreed with the local
revenue administrations as quickly as possible. It is also advisable to pay any additional
tax quickly to limit the interest. Finally, depending on the situation, a settlement may be
the best thing for prior years followed by an agreement that arm's-length terms would
apply in the future.""*
It is important for MNEs to review their transfer pricing policies before the Tax
Inspector knocks on the door and asks: 'Is your transfer pricing policy at arm 's length?
'
The U.S. regulations on penalties address this question directly and the company must be
able to answer the question satisfactorily with relevant documentation within 30 days.^^
Consequently, if a MNE thinks it has transfer pricing issues in its business, it must look
at this as soon as possible. First, it must review the current transfer pricing methods to
determine if they are in accordance with the revenue guidelines in all tax jurisdictions
where it does business. Then, it must review the transfer pricing documentation to
determine if it has a reasonable basis for support for the transfer prices currently in use.^^
-' OECD guidelines, at 1.12.
^'Coopers, at 120-122.
" McDermott, Transfer Pricing under US Law, at 141 (1995).
" OECD guidelines, at P-1.
10
Tax administrations face specific problems at different levels. At the policy level,
countries need to reconcile their right to tax income, considered to arise within their
jurisdiction, to avoid double taxation. Coordination is better than tax competition. At the
practical level, countries sometimes have difficulties obtaining sufficient data located
outside their jurisdiction when determining that income. At the primary level, the taxing
rights of a country* depend on what system of taxation it uses. In a residence-based
system, the country' will also include income from sources outside that country in its tax
base, for any person considered being a resident in that jurisdiction. In a source-based
system all income arising within that jurisdiction is included in the tax base without
consideration of the residence of the taxpayer."
3 Tax Treaties
Another issue that should be considered, is the relationship between domestic
legislation and tax treaty provisions. A tax treaty may relieve taxation under the domestic
law of the Contracting States, but it can not impose taxation that is not contemplated in
that domestic law.^^ Each treaty is exclusively negotiated between the two Contracting
States.
For example, the IRS may adjust a transfer price downward to increase the taxable
income of a domestic company, if it determines that a foreign related party has
overcharged it for goods or services. If the foreign country in question agrees that the
transfer price were too high, it will make a correlative adjustment decreasing the income
" OECD guidelines, at 5.
^* Known as the golden rule.
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of the foreign affiliate, if it declines some portion of the income will be subject to double
taxation.
With regard to transfer pricing issues, the relevant treaty articles are usually
intentionally wide and vague in defining the scope of their application and how to
compute an arm's-length price. But there is no obligation upon the relevant authorities of
the Contracting States to resolve these kind of disputes. Tax treaties are not taxing
statutes and are not interpreted as such. Domestic tax systems are subject to constant
change in detail and the treaty must therefore be broad enough not to go out of date. As
to transfer pricing issues, a tax treaty may assist in a broad sense, but important matters
of detail will rely on the domestic law of the Contracting states."^
However, tax treaties can affect transfer pricing in many ways. They can:
• Define a particular basis for allocation of income.
• Identify the transaction to which the basis will apply.
• Sometimes, even provide resolutions for disputes.
• Provide methods for mutual assistance between the tax authorities involved.^*^
The OECD has been important in developing international standards in this area and
its Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital forms the basis of the bilateral
income tax treaties between both OECD member countries and non-members. These
principles concerning the taxation ofMNEs are incorporated in other treaties too, namely
the United Nations Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing
Nations, and the United States Model Treaty. The common adoption of the arm's-length
principle in income tax treaties and in the OECD guidelines on transfer pricing




minimizes the potential for double taxation and provides a basis to resolve double tax
cases by mutual agreement through the competent authority process under the treaties.
But when transfer pricing is the issue, all these models are quite similar It is likely that a
vast number of transfer pricing issues in the future will be considered in the tax treaties
under the mutual agreement article/'
D. Indirect Taxes
There are also several non-tax aspects of transfer pricing such as customs, antitrust,
and dumping.
1 Dumping
Different sets of problems arise when we talk about the external pricing instead of the
internal operations of a MNE. If we concentrate on the U.S. antidumping law, it
presumes that foreign manufacturers should not be able to sell at a lower price in the U.S.
as compared to their home market.
Even though there is no direct connection between transfer pricing and anti-dumping
duties, the lower the transfer price the more likely that dumping may occur. An example
of this would be when import barriers make it almost impossible for US companies to
^' With a few exceptions, all 50 of the U.S. income tax treaties contain a 'Mutual Agreement article'. This
article requires the 'competent authorities' of the two treaty countries to consult each other in order to
eliminate double taxation.
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compete in another country while companies from that country can use profits earned at
home to lower their prices in the U.S.^'
However, dumping is not the same as selling with a loss. Dumping is the difference
in price between the home market and the U.S. export price. Even if a company is
making profits at a lower price, it can still be dumping. To break the antidumping law'^^
foreign goods must be sold for less than their fair value and such imports must have
injured a specific US industry. ^^
It is worth noting that transfer pricing rules and the antidumping law operate
independently, i.e., that the antidumping provisions are blind to intercompany transfer
prices. It is only the price of the ultimate sale to an unrelated party that matters. The
problem is the conflict between a company's incentives under the antidumping
provisions and the transfer tax rules. To avoid an investigation of dumping, a subsidiary
of a foreign producer may want to set the U.S. prices high. But that could instead cause a
transfer price inquiry. If you increase the U.S. price without making appropriate changes
in the transfer price, you will create larger margins and most likely create a higher tax
liability for the subsidiary.
^^
This relation between the U.S. antidumping law and transfer price rules shows how
difficult it is to please everyone. Tax practitioners regard the antidumping statutes as
setting the price for imports, and therefore placing the taxpayer in a "Catch-22" position
as to transfer pricing issues.
^- McDermott, Transfer Pricing under US Law, at 254 (1995).
" Adopted in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, 19 U.S.C § 1671 et seq.
^* McDermott, at 255.
" Id, at 258.
36 McKee, Dumping and Transfer Pricing: Is there a Conflict?, Tax Management Int. Journal (1992).
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But is there really a conflict between dumping and transfer pricing? It may seem
obvious that if you lower the import price in the U.S., it must be dumping. But if we
presume that the U.S. price is a market price, a change in the transfer price cannot affect
a dumping determination. As long as resale prices to uncontrolled parties are not
determined as a matter of business policy by transfer prices, the final conclusion must be
that the allocation of profits between connected companies under Section 482 can have
no effect in finding evidence of dumping.^'
2. Antitrust
The antitrust laws of the U.S. and most other jurisdictions prohibit competitors to fix
prices among themselves. However, under the transfer pricing regulations, the taxpayer
must provide evidence that their intercompany transfer prices are in fact at arm's length
level. The easiest way to do that is to provide information that open market transactions
from non-integrated competitors have similar prices. When obtaining such information a
question may arise whether that exchange of information was used to fix prices on the
-JO
market. How do the companies avoid raising that question?
The most convenient way may be to obtain such information from a third party, for
example an accounting firm, a party not involved in the industry. This way, the company
will not know the identities of the competitors from whom the information was gathered.
^^ McDermott, at 258-259.
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As a result, it will rebut any inference that the information was used for collusive
purpose, and not just for transfer pricing analysis.
^^
Another, not quite as safe, mechanism is to utilize persons who are not themselves
allowed to set prices. The company can then be accused of exchanging information at
some level with competitors.
3. .Customs
Goods transported across borders are often subject to custom duties and other taxes,
like the value added tax. When determining the transfer price, the MNE must consider
the conflicts that may exist between two customs jurisdictions and careftilly plan the
price to satisfy the requirements of both the tax and customs authorities.'*^
The tax authorities prefer that a low transfer price be employed, so they can tax a
high gain. Since they have to decide the right arm's-length price within their jurisdiction,
the way the MNE set its transfer price has great importance.
Their antipode is the custom authorities, which prefer high transfer prices in order to
receive high custom taxes."*' Normally, there is no import duty on intangibles: such as
commissions, royalties, license fees etc. But the value of the intangibles can be a part of
the imported goods if they are a specific part of the sale.
'^
Id, at 259.
*"' Coopers, at 158.





In the last tv\'o decades an increasing number of domestic companies have become
part of a MNE. The changes in business can be characterized by globaHzation,
streamhning and shareholder value orientation. The globalization requires effective
operational and management structures.'*"' But a MNE is a large organization, and it is
impossible for a central management to control all operations of the subsidiaries. For that
reason. MNEs are usually separated into divisions. The manager for each division
therefore has the freedom to act as an autonomous unit and to take actions necessary for
the business.
However, the problem for a decentralized organization is to evaluate the work of the
division managers; the central management needs to coordinate the divisions to
maximize the total profit of the MNE. A method is needed to measure each unit's
contribution to the MNE. That is why transfer pricing is used for intermediate goods that
are transferred among the divisions:
1
.
to evaluate division managers performance, how much profit they generate,
2. to help coordinate the goals set up by the MNE,
3. to enable the divisions to decide the final price of the product, and
4. to preserve the division's autonomy.
From a managerial point of view, the incentives to use arm's-length prices are quite
strong to be able to see the real result of every unit. The problem might be that the
objectives of the central organization and the division do not always match.
^^ Borstell, at 4.
Arieh Gavious, at 2, Transfer Pricing (1996).
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F. Importance of US Rules
The U.S. rules in the transfer price area are important for many reasons. First of all,
most MNEs have the U.S. as a market, and therefore have to adjust their prices to the
tough US rules. Secondly, the reformation of the U.S. rules influences other countries in
sharpening their own rules. If one understands the developments, and the controversies
that follow, in the U.S., it is easier to understand similar issues in other countries.
Thirdly, the U.S. interpretation of the arm's-length standard is not popular among their
trading partners. Finally, the Advanced Pricing Agreement program is becoming more
and more important to MNEs in reassuring them that their transfer prices meet the
requirements from the tax authorities.'*^
Ever since the new regulations in Section 482, there has been a discussion among the
industrialized countries that the U.S. approach based on profit methods does not conform
to the arm's-length principle. Their point of view is that the application of stringent
documentation and penalty rules is nothing else than an attempt to obtain more than its
fair share of the worldwide profits of MNEs. "^^
The U.S. approach has actually led to open retaliation from some countries,
especially Japan. After the IRS had scrutinized Japanese companies in the U.S., the
Japanese tax authorities have imposed additional taxes due to unaccepted transfer
pricing, aimed at US-based MNEs. The largest cases invoke more than $350 million in
taxable income.'*^ There is much of criticism from non-US tax authorities of the level of
45 OECD guidelines, at 1.5.




detail that is included in the U.S. regulation and procedures. One reason for this is that
the U.S. corporate tax system is a self-assessment system, meaning that the burden of
proof is placed on the taxpayer, unlike in most other countries.'*^
The IRS has extensive resources and transfer pricing audits are not limited to cases
where they suspect avoidance. In fact, especially foreign owned MNEs must be careful. ^°
Another major deviation of the U.S. system from the system in effect in Europe is that
the IRS does not accept, for taxation purposes, that intangible property can be sold
outright for a fixed price. Generally, IRS requires that income in respect to the transfer or
license of intangibles shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the
intangible.^' Since the U.S. has great importance in the world trade and the IRS has






In early September 1995, the European Chamber of Commerce issued a survey of the incidents of audits
of foreign-based and U.S.-based operations of multinational corporations, finding that 42 percent of the
companies responding believed they had been subject to discriminatory audits by the IRS. The survey also
found that, between 1990 to 1993, the frequency of IRS audits of these foreign-owned operations rose by
353 percent, while the audit frequency of foreign operations of U.S.-based multinationals fell by 31
percent. Hembrey, Guidelines Amid US-European Conflict (1995).
^' See IRC §482.
"Coopers, at 9-10.
II. DIFFERENT TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS
AND SPECIFIC ISSUES
The transactions within a MNE can take many different forms. The intercompany
transactions include transfers of tangible and intangible property, leasing arrangements,
and supplies of different services etc. But most important, it is the substance, not the
form, of the situation that will determine if a transfer has occurred. Whether an invoice
has been sent or not is not dispositive. Even a simple telephone call from the parent
company to its subsidiary can be the target of transfer pricing audit if the parent provides
management services.
The almost universal rule for sufficient compensation is the arm's-length principle,
which is the international transfer pricing standard that OECD Member countries have
agreed should be used for tax purposes by MNE groups and tax administrations."^ If the
transfer price does not reflect the market forces and the arm's-length principle, the tax
liabilities of the MNE and the tax base of the host country will be distorted.^"*
A. The Arm's-Length Principle
The authoritative statement of the arm's-length principle is to be found in paragraph





[When] conditions are made or imposed between....two [associated]
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits
which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.
This principle requires that the compensation for the transactions described in this
chapter shall correspond to the same level as between unrelated parties, if all other
factors remain the same. Even if the principle is simply stated, the determination of the
right price is very difficult, (e.g., if a MNE is dealing in an integrated production of
highly specialized goods or in the provision of specialized services). In addition, the
pressure from the shareholders, forcing the MNE to show high profitability at the parent
company level may also distort the transfer price.
'"^
Facts and circumstances have to be taken into consideration in every case. For
example, the payment could take the form of a lump sum or of royalty payments. Also, it
may be hard to find and interpret evidence from which arm's-length prices can be
deduced, or on which to base a determination of an arm's-length price. Associated
enterprises may also engage in transactions that independent enterprises would not
undertake.'^ Thus, it is usually difficult to find evidence of what conditions would have
been established between independent companies. It is important that the tax authorities
have a flexible approach to the matter.
Since the Governments pay this much attention to transfer prices, it is important that
we have internationally consistent yardsticks by which to measure them. The main
'^ OECD guidelines, at 1.2.
" OECD guidelines, at 1.10.
''Id.
" Collins, at 6.
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transfer pricing principle is the same ever>'where in the world - to assess for tax purposes
value and profit based on financial contribution and commercial risk.^^ The arm's-length
principle removes tax considerations from economic decisions, by putting associated and
independent enterprises on an equal level, and thereby promoting the growth of
international trade and investment.^^ However, the arm's-length principle may result in
an administrative burden when it is time to evaluate different types of transactions. The
application of the arm's-lengths principle is discussed in detail in chapter 3 and 4.
Depending on the character of property or service transferred, their value differs in
the open market. Similarity in the characteristics is ver>' important when comparing
prices of controlled and uncontrolled transactions. But quite the contrary when one
compares profit margins. When one transfers tangible property, the physical features of
the property, its qualit>' and reliability are some important factors. When transferring
intangibles, important characteristics are the form of the transaction, the type of property,
the duration and degree of protection, and the expected benefits from the use of the
property
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B. Sales of Tangibles
The term above refers to all physical assets of a business, even if it is raw materials,
work in progress or finished goods. This is referred to as sales of inventory. Goods from
these categories can be manufactured by the seller or bought from a third party.
Naturally, tax rules require that arm's-length prices be used for sales between related
Pagan, at 99.
OECD guidelines, at 1.7.
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parties, determined by direct reference to the prices of 'comparable" products. A
comparable product is of similar standard, almost identical, sold under the same
economic circumstances, with equal market conditions, sold between unrelated parties.^'
Sale of tangible property also includes machinery and equipment used in the
business, often provided by the parent company to the manufacturing subsidiar>'. The
parent should receive an arm's-length payment for the equipment whether it is new or
used, manufactured or bought from third party. In such a situation, one tries to find the
fair market value at the time of the transaction.
Sometimes situations may occur when an alternative approach to that described
above is appropriate. For example, organization or incorporation of businesses could
trigger tax charges, based on the sale of assets at their fair market value. Many countries,
however, would offer arrangements to waive the tax in those situations.
^^
C. Transfer of Intangibles
The term intangible can be divided into six broad categories of property specified in
the regulations^^, provided that the item has value independent of the services of any
individual. These categories of property include:
• Patents, formulas, inventions, processes, patterns, designs, or know-how;
• Copyrights and literary, or artistic compositions;
• Trademarks, brand names or trade names;
^°
Id, at 1.19.
^' Coopers, at 7-8. But do these comparable transactions exist? Most likely no!
" Id, at 6-8.
" Reg. §1.482-4(b)and Reg. §1.482-4T(b).
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• Contracts, franchises or licenses;
• Methods, systems, programs, campaigns, procedures, studies, surveys, estimates or
technical data; and
• Any other similar item that derives its value from its intellectual value, in opposite to
its physical attributes.
Intangibles are methods of transferring the use of information, expertise or know-
how. The intangibles are usually made available through agreements with compensation
64m return.
The intangibles are also called entry barriers and can create a monopoly if a patent is
very effective or if a company owns the world's source of a certain raw material. These
are also known as '"super" intangibles. If the intangible does not create a monopoly it is





2. transfer without compensation,
3. license in exchange for some kind of royalty, or
4. royalty-free license.
The general rule in this context is that the tax authorities do not accept transfers
without payments, i.e. gifts. The most common transfer within the MNE is through
licenses. A practical difficulty is also that commercial circumstances within the MNE
differ from transactions that an independent company would undertake. For example, it
would be unlikely for a company to sell an intangible for a fixed price to an unrelated
^ Pagan, at 115.
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company when the profit potential cannot be determined in advance. ^^ It would for
example be unlikely for a company to enter into a license agreement with independent
companies without stringent controls to protect the value of the intangible. These factors
would be of little concern to a transfer within a MNE, and the internal transfer price
might therefore not reflect the transfer price to unrelated parties. As to transfer pricing
we can divide the intangibles into manufacturing and marketing categories. ^^
1 . Manufacturing Intangibles
Manufacturing intangibles are primarily related to patents, a government grant of a
right to the inventor against others for a period of time, and technical know-how. When a
patent is transferred, it is important to know the degree of monopoly power conveyed by
the patent in order to determine the appropriate compensation. But there is always a risk
that the patent is not as valuable as it seems. In the end, it is the market forces that
determine the economic value. Even a monopolist must sell his product to get rich from
it.^^
Technical know-how is the specific knowledge that makes it possible to manufacture
a certain product, whether or not capable of being patented. Any disclosure of know-how
must reduce the value of the intangible property. In some industries this is worth very
il o
little, and in others a fortune.
OECD guidelines, at 1.10.
68
Coopers, at 9.
Stiroh, Modern methodsfor the valuation ofintellectual property, at 1 (1998).
Coopers, at 10.
25
There are different methods for valuing intellectual propert>': profit splitting,
comparison to another technology, discounted cash flow analysis, willingness to pay and
willingness to sell, and the option value method. The methods mentioned could be used
to determine the value of intellectual property both when it is embodied in a finished
production process and when it is still being developed. Usually, profit sharing methods
do not consider the level of the "willingness to pay" of the user and are therefore not
likely to give the true value of the intangible. Comparable methods are more a means of
providing information than a method of evaluating intangibles.^^
2. Marketing Intangibles
This category includes trademarks, trade names, good will, and well-developed sales
force for example. A trademark is a product-specific intangible and an identification of a
product in the form of a name or a logo. As for transfer pricing, the trademark has zero
value when the product is marketed for the first time. One hopes that the value increases
over time. A trade name is a company-specific intangible under which a company
conducts its business, and therefore applies to all products manufactured and marketed
by a company. The trade name or the company's good-will, depending on the power of
the brand, usually has a value in most markets when a new product is introduced.
A company with a strong name will most certainly have a well-developed salesforce
that in fact could be the most valuable intangible, since it's familiar with the company, its
customers and the market. If a foreign parent company establishes a subsidiary in the




to its personnel, the intangible of value is the ability to provide service to the customers.




Some intangibles can be both a manufacturing and marketing intangible. Like
corporate reputation or software. The transfer of software to customers has elements of
both a sale and a license. The important transfer pricing question is however, 'which
legal entity did develop the intangible?' The developer must receive remuneration for the
use of its property, at an arm's-length level, of course.^'
D. Different Kind of Services
How to set a price on services performed between companies in the same business
group is not an easy task. The general rule is that where one related party renders
marketing, managerial, administrative, technical or other services for the benefit of or on
behalf of another related party, an arm's-length charge must be made. Each country
involved wishes to receive tax payments for income generated by any service rendered to
a foreign affiliate. The problem may be the different approach to definition of the arm's-
length price in the various countries: Is it the cost of providing the service with a margin
of profit included? Another factor is that only payments for services that are directly
70
Coopers, at 1 1-12.
Id.
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beneficial can be deducted in the tax return to reduce taxable income. If the benefits are
indirect or remote, no charges may be made.
For example, if an international airline ('"A") in its advertising mentions a related
party's ("'B") hotels in the locations to which it flies, B will benefit from this advertising
even if the purpose is to promote A"s airline business. In this case the tax authorities may
allocate the income for an arm's-length charge, since A would probably have charged an
unrelated hotel operator for the benefit of being mentioned. The charge should be based
on the facts known at the time when the service was performed. Further, the charge must
conform to the intended benefits at the time the service was rendered, even if those
benefits did not occur.
'^
The different kinds of services normally provided within a MNE are:
• Routine services where no intangible is transferred. This group includes accounting
or legal services.
• Technical assistance usually in connection with the transfer of an intangible.
• A service, technical in nature, but received without a related intangible.
• Transfer of employees. When opening up a new plant, key employees are often sent
there to start it up and train new personnel. The question is if the knowledge and
experience of that employee is an intangible transferred that should be reimbursed by
the subsidiary to the parent company? The tax authorities sometimes take that
position.




Sometimes the activities performed by the parent are not such that a charge should be
made. The reason is that they might been performed by the parent in its role as a
shareholder instead of providing value to the subsidiary. Shareholder services are made
with the purpose of protecting the interest in the investment. When one reviews a transfer
pricing policy, these kinds of issues are of great importance in order to determine
whether the services provided by the parent directly benefits one or more companies or
duplicates services done by the subsidiar>'. An example of the latter could be a marketing
poll made by the subsidiary but later redone by the parent. In this case the parent cannot




If a company needs to finance research and development (R&D) but does not have
sufficient funds within the company, this method is often used. The idea is that the MNE
as whole shares the costs involved in the R&D but gives all companies involved ftiU
rights to the result.
The concept of cost sharing is simple but involves many hard questions relating both
to accounting and to taxation. However, the advantages are several:
^'' Coopers, at 13-14.
'^Mat 15.
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• It precludes the need to determine a royalty rate, since all participants own an equal
share of the income generated by the intangible.
• It is a way to finance R&D when the parent is performing poorly but subsidiaries in
other locations are doing well.
• It provides means of utilizing funds from the subsidiaries, which in fact will be closer




The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). established
77
in 1961, has 29 members and promotes policies designed to achieve economic growth
and employment, contribute to sound economic expansion and to the expansion of world
trade through a muhilateral. non-discriminatory basis. Their guidelines on transfer
pricing have the purpose of securing the appropriate tax base in each jurisdiction, so
double taxation and conflicts between tax administrations can be avoided.
^^
A. The OECD Guidelines
In July 1995 OECD issued the first chapters of its revised guidelines on
intercompany transfer pricing (the 1 995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations). The guidelines purpose is to represent an
international consensus on the application of the arm's-length standard, intended to
govern the resolution in transfer pricing cases between member countries as a basis for
figuring the tax liability of foreign-owned firms. However, many observers believe that
some countries, particularly the U.S., will attempt to use non-conventional methods to
determine the tax liability of some foreign-owned firms, despite the guidelines'
^' OECD member countries are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
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reportedly "strict" limitations on the use of such methods. The OECD regards all
methods as being transactional in nature, with a distinction made between traditional
transaction methods and transaction profit methods. The traditional transaction methods
are:
• the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP),
• the resale price method, and,
• the cost-plus method.
The definition of a transaction profit method is: A transfer pricing method that
examines the profits that arise fr-om particular controlled transactions of one or more of
the associated enterprises participating in those transactions^'^ In the guidelines this
method consists of the transactional net margin method (TNMM), and the profit-split
method. These methods should only be used if the traditional methods cannot be applied.
The OECD guidelines are not law but member countries are encouraged to follow
them. Due to lack of detailed transfer pricing rules in their domestic law, most member
countries traditionally do. Since July 1995, many countries have adopted formal transfer
pricing rules in accordance with the new guidelines (e.g.. Australia, Brazil, Korea,
on
Mexico, New Zealand and Spam).
The new transfer pricing regulations in the U.S. resulted in the unforeseen situation
that the OECD openly criticized a member state's tax rules. The OECD guidelines are in
many ways political compromises or enumeration of different views. And since the





guidelines are not legally binding for any of the tax authorities they cannot be enforced in
court.^'
An example of political compromise in the guidelines is the U.S. comparable profits
method (CPM). The IRS threatened to leave the negotiations ifCPM was not included in
the guidelines, and in particular Germany and Switzerland refused to sign the guidelines
if was included as an accepted method. OECD finally came up with the solution to
develop the transactional net margin method (TNMM). After the publishing of the new
guidelines, leading officials at the IRS stated they could not see any difference between
the TNMM and CPM. The German tax authorities proclaimed they would not apply
either TNMM or profit split methods since they believed the traditional transactional
methods to be sufficient enough.
"
There are a number of other important changes in the 1 995 version of the guidelines
from the earlier. There is recognition that it should not automatically be assumed that a
MNE attempts to manipulate its profits and that consideration of transfer pricing does not
automatically mean tax fraud or tax avoidance. Even though the OECD once again points
out that transfer pricing is not an exact science; they still require an exercise of
judgement both from the taxpayer and from tax administrations. Further, business
strategies must now be examined in determining comparability for transfer pricing
purposes. When it comes to penalties, the guidelines take the stance that it would be
unduly harsh and unfair to impose penalties when the taxpayer has made good faith






co-operation from the taxpayer should also not be so high that it makes it hard to
comply.
B. How to Apply the Arm's-Length Principle
The application of the arm's-length principle is based on a comparison of the
conditions in a controlled transaction between unrelated companies. This requires that the
economically relevant characteristics are sufficiently comparable, meaning that any
existing differences (e.g., price or margin) could materially affect the condition being
examined in the methodology. Unrelated companies would not enter into a transaction if
there were other, more attractive, transactions. This point is relevant for the question of
comparability, since level of risk and other economically relevant differences are taken
into the evaluation of available options. Below are the factors that should be considered
when assessing the comparability of a transaction.
1 . Characteristics of Property or Services
Depending on whether it is property or services that is transferred the value differs in
the open market.
Similarity in the characteristics will matter most when comparing prices of controlled
and uncontrolled transactions and not as much when comparing profit margins. When
tangible property is compared, the physical features, its quality and reliability are
*' Deloitte & Touche, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, at 4, November 1995.
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important factors. In the case of intangibles, the form of the transaction is of essential
importance (e.g.. license or sale); the type of property, the duration and expected
benefits, from the use of the property are also of importance.
"
2. Functional Analysis
The compensation exchanged in a transaction reflects the functions each company
performs. The starting point to any transfer pricing study is therefore the fiinctional
analysis, which generally examines the functions performed and risks and assets used by
the tested party. The structure and organization of the group as well as in what judicial
capacity the function is performed should get particular attention. This analysis is
supposed to determine the allocation of risk between the parties and therefore the
Oil
conditions to be expected in an arm's-length transaction. The analysis gives a company
better control as to overall transfer pricing analysis and its ultimate outcome. It is a
helpful tool in finding the best transfer pricing method. It is important to gather
information from more than one source, both from employees and industry experts.
^^
Functions that taxpayers and tax administrations should identify and compare include
design, manufacturing, research and development, marketing and management.
Adjustments should then be made for any material differences in the functions compared.
^^ OECD guidelines, at 1.16.
*^Mat 1.19.
^Ud,at 1.19 to 1.27.
*' Coopers, at 43.
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The types of risks to consider include market risks, investments in plant and equipment.
Q O
financial risks such as currency exchange rate and credit risks.
For years. US distribution companies of foreign MNEs have been under close
scrutiny by the IRS. especially those with operating losses, since the IRS assumes these
losses were a result of non-arm' s-length transfer pricing.
^^
3. Contractual Terms
The contractual terms of a transaction usually define how risks, benefits and
responsibilities are divided between the parties. Naturally, an analysis of the contractual
terms should be done under the functional analysis. If no written contract exist, the
relationship between the parties can be gathered from their correspondence or
communication or from generally accepted economic principles governing the
relationship between unrelated companies. Normally, divergence in interests between
parties ensures that the terms of the contract will be followed. Related parties may lack
that divergence, and further analysis can be used to determine if the contract is a sham.^^
4. Economic Circumstances
Even for transactions involving the same kind of property or services, the arm's-
length price is not always the same in different markets. Economic circumstances with
"' OECD guidelines, at 1.24.
^ Levey. U.S. Distr. Companies offoreign multinationals can present difficult transfer pricing issues.
Journal of International Taxation, Volume 8, Number 12, at 1 (1997).
^ OECD guidelines, at 1.28.
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relevance to the comparability of markets include, for example: different countries.
wholesale versus retail, the size of markets and the extent of competition
91
5. Business Strategies
To determine the comparability for transfer pricing purpose, business strategies must
also be examined.. Many factors relating to the daily conduct of business such as risk
aversion, input of existing and planned labor laws etc., must be taken into account. A
relevant consideration is whether the business strategy has been devised by the MNE or
if a member of the group is acting separately. This group very often includes market
penetration schemes, when the taxpayer lowers its price to gain market shares or to enter
a new market. It is important to remember that when a company tries to enter a new
market, not only lower price, but also start-up costs will give lower profits. These market
penetrations or expansions involve reductions in the taxpayer's current profits in
anticipation of increased future profits. " Therefore, when tax administrations are
evaluating the taxpayer's business strategy to see if it differs from potential comparable
transactions, the timing is of essence.
Several factors have to be evaluated to see if the taxpayer's claim that it was
following a business strategy, giving higher profits in the long-run, should be considered:
• Is the conduct of the parties consistent with the strategy?
" Id, at 1 .30.
'-/<:/, at 1.31 to 1.33.
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• Is the nature of the relationship between the parties conforming to the fact that the
taxpayer is bearing the costs of the strategy? Most certainly not if the taxpayer is
acting as a sales agent with no responsibility for long-term market development.
• Will the strategy produce a return in profits within a period of time that would be
accepted in an arm's-length transaction? When determining what is an acceptable
period of time the tax administrations must take other commercial strategies in that
particular country into consideration.
C. Traditional Transaction Methods
The guidelines study various pricing methodologies; they do however prefer the
'traditional transaction methods', since they are the most direct. A taxpayer is to choose
the method that gives the best estimation of an arm's-length price. Transfer pricing is not
an exact science; it is therefore difficult to find a method that suits every situation. In real
life, the MNEs and tax authorities usually use some sort of evaluation of the fairness of
the price. So even if the methods described in the guidelines have a limited practical
value, they nevertheless represent some basic thoughts on how to determine the arm's-
length price.
Mat 1.34 to 1.35.
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1 Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method
This method offers the most direct way of determining the right price. The
comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) compares the price charged in a controlled
transaction for propert\ or services transferred to an uncontrolled transaction under
comparable circumstances. One of two conditions must be met in order to make this
comparison.
Differences, if any. between the transactions are not allowed to materially affect the
price in the open market, for example, if the only uncontrolled transaction available for
comparison involves apples from Argentina and the controlled transaction involves
apples from Chile. In that case, h would be appropriate to examine whether the
difference in apples has a material affect on the price.
The other condition is if reasonable accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate
the differences stated above. "^ If adjustments cannot be made, the reliability of the
method is naturally reduced. An example of when adjustments are to be made to the price
is when the only difference between the compared transactions is that the controlled price
is a delivered price, but the uncontrolled sales are made fo.b. factory. The difference
would then occur as to transportation and insurance, which would have quite an impact
on the price.
^^
Even though OECD strongly recommends this method "the CUP method is
preferable over all other methods"^^; the guidelines clearly show a number of difficulties
'•"OECD guidelines, at 2.11.
''
Id, at 2.6 to 2.7.
^ Mat 2.12.
" Id, at 2.7.
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in its application: The property or service transferred must be similar in character in the
transactions compared. It has to be an economically comparable situation, i.e., the
markets has to be economically comparable. Finally, the transfer has to be on the same
level in the chain between manufacturer and consumer.
2. Resale Price Method
This method begins with the price for a product purchased from a related party and
then resold to an unrelated party. This resale price is then reduced by an appropriate
gross margin, aimed to cover the expenses and make a justified profit for the reseller.
The remaining price is considered to be an arm's-length price for the original transfer
between the related parties. The method is supposed to be most useful in marketing
operations where the reseller does not add anything substantially to the value of the
product. The method is generally most accurate when a short time has elapsed between
the purchase and the reselling.
3. Cost Plus Method
The third one of the traditional transactional methods is the cost plus method. It has
its starting point at the cost incurred by the supplier of property (e.g., a contract
manufacturer) or service transferred in a controlled transaction to a purchaser.
'* Mat 2.14 to 2.23.
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The arm's-length price, including profit, is then determined by adding a fair cost plus
mark-up, considering functions performed and in light of current market conditions. The
mark up is the percentage earned in a controlled or uncontrolled transaction. This method
is most useful where semifinished goods or services are transferred or where long-term
buy-and-supply arrangements are at hand. Or when the resale price method is impossible
99
to use.
The method is particularly difficult to use when in determining costs involved, the
method relies upon a comparison of the mark up cost accomplished by the controlled
supplier to the costs achieved by uncontrolled entities in a comparable transaction. One
must therefore analyze any possible difference in the cost base that could have an effect
on the mark up cost to determine what adjustments need to be made. A comparative
review of the accounting policies is also important to define the proper mark-up.
'°^
D. Transactional Profit Methods
This group of methods is to be applied when the traditional transaction methods are
not reliable enough. The approaches of the "profit methods' examine the profits that arise
from particular transactions among related companies. These kinds of methods have been
under a lot of criticism as being unrealistic, when most companies do not divide their
mutual profit afterwards, except for partnerships and joint ventures.
^
Id, at 2.32.
'"'' Coopers, at 30.
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1 Profit Split Method
The profit spHt method establishes transfer pricing by dividing the profits Hke
independent enterprises would have in a joint venture relationship. This method is most
suitable when transactions are so interrelated that they cannot be evaluated separate. The
guidelines also point out that the transfer price should be based on expected profits, not
actual profits, because it is not possible to know actual profits at the time the conditions
are established.'
'
When computing the arm's-length price one needs to know how unrelated parties
would have split the profit, based on the same facts and circumstances. The problem is
that this kind of information is hard to find. To estimate the division of profits, the
guidelines recommend two approaches: the contribution analysis and the residual
analysis.
a. Contribution Analysis
The combined profits from the transactions being controlled are divided based upon
the relative value of the functions performed, supplemented with external market data (if
possible) on how independent companies would have done under similar circumstances.
Generally, it is the operating profit that is divided, even if it sometimes may be
appropriate to split the gross profits and then deduct expenses incurred to relevant
102
company.
'°'OECD guidelines, at 3.11.
'°- Mat 3.5 to 3.17.
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b. Residual Analysis
The combined profit is divided in two steps:
1. Sufficient profit is allocated to provide each participant with a basic return
appropriate for the transaction of its involvement.
2. Any remaining residual profit or loss is then allocated based on an analysis of facts
and circumstances that might point out how independent companies would have
done. Important factors in this analysis are contribution of intangible property and
relative bargaining positions especially useful.'
^
2. Transactional Net Margin Method
The transactional net margin method (TNMM) is defined in the guidelines as:
A transactional profit method that examines the net profit margin relative to an
appropriate base (e.g., costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer realizes fi'om a controlled
transaction.
'""^
Notice that the guidelines use the term net profit margin instead of profits. That
means that the method is meant to operate in a manner similar to the cost-plus and resale
price methods. The difference between this method and the traditional transaction
methods is that it relies more on indirect indicia. That is also a reason for its lower




Deloitte & Touche, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, at 3, November 1995.
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The TNMM is in substance not that different from the U.S. CPM - neither method
requires the same level of comparabilit>' in product and function as required in the
traditional methods. The presumption is that the profits for companies within the same
business under similar circumstances should be almost the same in the long run. The
problem with this classic economic theor>' is that it does not take the short perspective in
consideration. The theorv' about perfect competition does further not include all
branches.
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The TNMM requires, like all other methods, that a functional analysis be done. The
next step is to identify potential comparable transactions. As always, it is preferable if
one can identify an uncontrolled external transaction in which the company is
participating, with appropriate adjustments for eventual differences.
An example on differences could be a taxpayer that sells top quality TV's to an
associated company but the only profit information available on comparable business
transactions is sales of lower quality TV's. Presume further that the top quality TV
market is increasing in sales, has a high entr>' barrier, not many competitors, and with
differences in design and performance characteristics. All of these differences are likely
to have material effect on the profitability and adjustments must be made. The reliability
of the adjustments will, of course, affect the reliability of the analysis. Finally, even if
two companies are in exactly the same business, the profitability may depend on market
shares, competitive positions etc.
"^ Wright, TNMM - The OECD's response to CPM: Are they really different, at 307, European Taxation
(1995).
107 OECD guidelines, at 3.37.
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As mentioned earlier, the TNMM is considered to be the last resort to be used only
when the traditional transaction methods are not reliably applied alone or exceptionally
cannot be applied at all. A CUP may be hard to find because of product and market
differences, and a resale price method is unreliable since the gross margin of the
independent enterprises needs to be greater than of an associated enterprise to reflect
unknown functions and costs. Also, the method may be useful when checking the
reasonableness of the result from the traditional methods or when using an "Advance
1 0R
Pricing Agreement".
An example of when the method is useful is when there is insufficient data on
uncontrolled transactions, or when such data are considered unreliable. '^^ When that is
the case, net margins are more reliable in order to assess the difference in transfer price






IV. THE U.S. TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS
A. Introduction
As mentioned earlier (see chapter I.F). there is no doubt that the developments in the
U.S. affect legislative developments and the attitude of tax authorities of the major
trading partners of the U.S. This is particular true in the area of transfer pricing, since the
U.S. rules are without question the toughest and most comprehensive in the world today.
In 1986. by adding the "commensurate with income* standard when transferring
intangible property. Congress amended Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code for the
first time in over 60 years. It also directed the IRS to conduct a comprehensive study of
intercompany transfer pricing, the applicable regulations under Section 482, and the need
for new enforcement tools and strategies. This focus on transfer pricing reflected a belief
that MNEs operating in the U.S. were often setting their prices in an arbitrary maimer,
with the result that taxable income in the U.S. might be misstated. Further, the lack of
documentation on how the pricings were set made it very difficult for the IRS to conduct
retrospective audits to determine whether the arm's-length standard had been applied in
practice. The IRS generally found that no analysis or documentation existed to explain
the appropriateness of transfer prices
111
'" Raby, Transfer Pricing -An International Guide, International Tax Review, at 93-94 (1997).
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The overall aim of the IRS was to shift the focus from after-the-fact audit and
litigation of transfer pricing controversies to encouragement of upfront taxpayer
compliance and advance resolution of transfer pricing issues. In the following years new^
sections of the Code were either added or amended to impose on taxpayers new
information reporting and recordkeeping requirements and also to give the IRS Revenue
agents enhanced access to that kind of information. Finally, in 1994, the final Section
482 regulations were issued and in 1995 the regulations on cost sharing. In 1996. final
transfer pricing penalty regulations were issued under Section 6662. "
Section 482 authorizes the IRS to adjust the income, deductions, credits, or
allowances of commonly controlled taxpayers in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect their income. The IRS goal in administering Section 482 is to ensure
that each taxpayer reflects its true taxable income from intercompany transactions as
determined under the arm's-length standard. It provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether
or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Secretar>' [of the Treasury] may distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among
such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license)
of intangible property, (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the
income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with
the income attributable to the intangible.
Reallocations based upon tax avoidance grounds are intended to prevent shifting of
income or profits. But reallocations can also be made in situations where the incomes of
"^Coopers, at 126-127.
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the parties are not clearly reflected, even if no evidence of tax evasion can be found. In
general, a transfer price that does not distort income is the price that would have been
charged by unrelated parties negotiating at arm's length. However the statute is simple in
principle, it has found to be difficult to apply. Transfer pricing is a complex process with
many variables independent from tax avoidance attempts. Also, a lot of the transactions
being challenged under Section 482 would never occur between uncontrolled parties."^
The Commissioner's determination under Section 482 shall be accepted by a court unless
it is arbitrary, unreasonable or without justification, see Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Commissioner. ^^^ Quite often the Commissioner's determination has been found to be
arbitrar)' and the Tax Court has computed the arm's-length price based on all of the
evidence. "
1 . The Best Method Rule
Based on the arm's-length standard, there are several methods to choose from in the
regulations. The taxpayer must select one of the pricing methods, and the '"best method"
rule is established to help the taxpayer to choose a method most suitable under the
particular circumstances of the case. Under this rule a method should be chosen that
provides the most reliable measure of an arm's-length result under the facts and
circumstances.
"^ Thompson, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS, at 397-398 (1995).
"^856F.2d855(7*Cir.l988).
'" Thompson, at 398.
48
Two primary factors are to be considered when selecting a method and comparing
reliability of that method:
• The degree ofcomparability between the controlled transaction and any uncontrolled
comparable.
• The quality ofthe data and assumptions used in the analysis. '
'^
Deficiencies in the data used or assumptions made can have more impact on some
methods than others. The resale price method focuses on the analysis of functions and
risks, while the profit split method determines business activity of particular importance.
Further, differences in management efficiency could be of greater importance in a CPM
analysis than on a CUP analysis."
Adjustments must be made to the uncontrolled comparables if they will improve the
reliability of the results obtained under the selected pricing method. The above
mentioned factors to be considered ultimately involves questions of fact. Therefore, the
taxpayer is in a better position than the IRS to prepare a case about the reasonableness of
its transfer pricing, especially if it has prepared the documentation prior to filing its tax
return. The regulations address a situation in which two (or more) methods applied
provide inconsistent results and the best method rule does not make it clear which one to
use. If a third method then is used and is proven to be consistent with one of the previous
I 1 ^
methods, that would indicate that the previous method is the best method. The final
1994 Section 482 regulations offer more flexibility than before but taxpayers may find
that they have a somewhat heavier documentation burden under the best method rule."
"^ McDermon, at 23.
"^Fuller, at 70-71.
"'Reg. §1.482-l(c)(2)(iii).
'" Fuller, at 70.
49
2. Comparability
The regulations provide several specific methods that can be used in various
circumstances to test the arm's-length nature of a MNEs pricing structure. All of these
specific methods are also subject to general rules on comparability. '^° The comparability
of transactions and circumstances must be evaluated based on a comparison of all factors
that could affect prices or profits in transactions entered into on an arm's-length basis.
The factors include functions performed, contractual terms, risks assumed, economic
conditions present and the characteristics of the property transferred or the services
provided in the controlled and uncontrolled transactions.'^' Further, a functional analysis
must be made to determine the degree of comparability.
3. The Arm's-Length Range
Under the U.S. regulations, no adjustments will be made to the pricing results if those
results are within an arm's-length range derived from two or more comparable
uncontrolled transactions. This concept of a range of acceptable outcomes instead of only
one correct arm's-length price is important to understand, because this flexible
application of the arm's-length standard underlies the U.S. regulations.
The comparables must however meet a fairly high level of comparability, and the
arm's-length range may be based on the use of more than one pricing method. The
reliability of the range analysis can further be improved by statistical methods. If the
'^°Reg. §1.482-1 (d).
'' See chapter III B on how to apply the arm's-length principle.
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results are outside the range, the IRS will adjust those results to a mid-point of the range.
However, the main focus of the U.S. regulations is that the taxpayer has reported arm's-
length results in its tax return, the actual methods or procedures used to set the transfer
1 77
price is of no relevance.
The regulations establish two ways to calculate an arm's-length range. First, when
using uncontrolled comparables, the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) the data
must be complete, in order to identify all material differences; (2) these differences must
ITT
have an effect on price or profit; (3) appropriate adjustments must have been made.
If the foregoing conditions are not met, the range is adjusted by applying valid
statistical techniques, i.e. the arm's-length range usually consist of the 25'*^ percentile to
the 75^"^ percentile of the results, which would provide an equal level of confidence. If the
taxpayer succeed in establishing that their results are within this range, no allocation will
be made.'^'*
It is important to note that the IRS does not need to establish an arm's-length range
before making an allocation under Section 482. Thus, an allocation may be proposed
based on a single comparable uncontrolled price, assuming that the uncontrolled price
method is properly applied. The taxpayer may, however, avoid the allocation by showing
that the results claimed on its return are within the range established by equally reliable
comparable uncontrolled prices. After making an allocation, the IRS will take into
'"Raby, at95.





account appropriate collateral adjustments, including correlative allocations, conforming
adjustments, and setoffs.
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B. The Pricing Methods
The various pricing methods are applications of basic valuation methods to related
party transactions that typically take place in the context of international trade. These
valuation methods are further modified in order to reflect any variations in the nature of
the controlled transaction or the available data. The result is a menu of different pricing
methods, divided into two groups: tangible and intangible property. When the tangible
property has an "imbedded intangible" (i.e., the goods carry a trademark or trade name),
the transfer will not be considered a transfer of the intangible, and the transfer should
ordinarily be determined under the rules for tangible goods. However, if the controlled
buyer acquires rights to exploit the intangible beyond normal commercial practices
associated with the resale of the product, an arm's-length price for the intangible must be
determined separately under the rules for transfers of intangible property
128
1 . Tangible Property
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3 provides rules for transfers of tangible property. Under this
provision we consider the Manufacturer-Distributor activity. Six methods are provided:





methods. Although the U.S. regulations do not prescribe a strict priority system when
applying the different methods, the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) seems
to be the preferred method for tangible property. ^"^ Under both the U.S. regulations and
the Guidelines, the CUP method focuses on the comparability on products. The other two
of the "traditional transaction methods" (the resale price method and the cost plus
method) are concerned about the comparability of functions.
There are no material substantive differences between the U.S. regulations and the
Guidelines on how these methods are to be applied. The Guidelines do however consider
practical problems in the application of data from comparable uncontrolled transactions
to be an exception, while the experience in the U.S. has been that it is often impossible to
identify uncontrolled transactions that meet the standards for comparability.
'^°
Comparability adjustments are to be made when, for example, there is potential
differences in operating expenses and geographic markets. Other important factors are
business experience and management efficiency, but the regulations do not say how they
are to be taken into account. The addition of these two comparability factors could even
result in a request from IRS for sensitive personnel and compensation data.'^'
a. Comparable Profits Method
The comparable profit method (CPM) is a new method and can be applied to
transfers of both tangible and intangible property, and is listed as the fourth possible
'''Id.
'^' See chapter III.B.C.l.
'^° Raby, at 96-97.
'^'Coopers, at 131.
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method under which to test the arm's-length nature of tangible property transfer prices.'"^
The CPM is supposed to be a method of last resort, since the result most of the times do
not achieve as high level of comparability or reliabilit>' as, for example, the CUP method.
As mentioned earlier under the best method rule, one factor to be taken into account in
selecting a method is whether another method produces results consistent with those
produced by the first method. The CPM can therefore be used as a test method to defend
the taxpayers transfer price derived under other methods.
'^^
The method refers to objective measures of profitability called '"profit level
indicators". These indicators are derived from uncontrolled parties engaged in similar
activities and under similar circumstances. Profit level indicators that may be used are the
return on operating assets (ROA), and financial ratios that measure relationships between
profit and costs or sales revenue (e.g., the operating margin or the Berry ratio).
It is sufficient if the profit level indicators are derived under a three-year period,
encompassing the taxable year under review and the preceding two taxable years. The
taxpayer is not allowed to base the profit level indicators on internal data collected from
its other divisions.'^" The related party, whose operating profit is tested is called the
"tested party", and can be another member of the MNE instead of the taxpayer, e.g., the
parent corporation.'^^ The difference between this method and the traditional methods is
'J]
5ee §1.482-5.
'"' McDermott. at 47.
'^"'
Reg. § 1 .482-5(b)(4). ROA is equal to operating profit divided by operating assets; Operating Margin is






that the '"CPM relies on the general principle that similarly situated taxpayers will tend to
earn similar returns over a reasonable period of time.
"'"^^
The CPM looks to companies engaged in comparable activities and applies their
returns on assets or financial ratios to the financial data of the tested party to construct a
range of acceptable operating profits. These comparable operating profits are then used
to test and adjust the controlled party's reported operating profit to the arm's-length
standard.
'^^
b. Profit Split Method
Profit split methods are specified methods with an emphasis on comparability and
with the intention to limit the use to unusual cases when other specified methods are
inapplicable, and a profit split method will produce a very different result than those
other specified methods.
However, courts, taxpayers, and even the IRS in transfer pricing controversies often
rely upon the methods. Two profit split methods may be applied to controlled
transactions involving both tangible and intangible property: the comparable profit split
and the residual profit split. The methods divide income on a formulary basis, but only
for specific controlled transactions and not to apportion the total income of a "unitary
business", applied by various states for state income taxes.''*






In the context of the manufacture and sale of tangible products, the profit split
method seeks to estimate an arm's-length return of profit by comparing the relative
economic contributions that two related parties make to the success of the combined
operation. The profit from the operation is divided between the two parties based on the
respective value of their contributions. The method relies on internal data and is
therefore not considered to be as reliable as other methods.''*'
The relative values of the contributions have to be based on the general factors for
comparability. The regulations fiirther state that the profit allocated either to the
manufacturer or the distributor does not have to be limited to the total operating profits
within the MNE from the relevant business activity in a given year, since some members
of the group make profits and others incurs losses.''*^
2. Intangible Propertv
Almost half of all adjustments that have been proposed by the IRS under Section 482
involve transfers of intangible property. The consideration paid for a transfer of an
intangible within a MNE usually takes the form of a royalty, and the determination of the
arm's-length character of the royalty rate ordinarily requires some evidence from
comparable transactions between uncontrolled parties. When such transactions cannot be





rate. The final regulations do give some guidance on acceptable methods in the absence
of comparables.''*"'
A case that clearly illustrates the potential tax deferral through the transfer of
intangibles to foreign corporations is Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner. 856 F.2d 855 (7'*^
Cir.1988). Lilly U.S.. a pharmaceutical company, transferred patents, technology and
know-how to a wholly owned corporation in Puerto Rico, Lilly PR. to be used in the
manufacturing and sale of painkillers. Lilly PR later sold the manufactured drugs back to
Lilly U.S. for distribution in the U.S. market. Lilly U.S. did not document its transfer
pricing methodology prior to filing its tax return and the transfer price paid was at issue
in the case. Lilly U.S. tried to defend its transfer price by using the resale price method
but only presented internal data to support the gross profit margins earned. The IRS used
the cost plus method to determine the transfer price but gave no credit to Lilly PR for its
ownership of the intangibles transferred to it by Lilly U.S. The court finally concluded
that Lilly U.S. was deemed to own all of the marketing intangibles and Lilly PR all of the
manufacturing intangibles.'"*"'
The problem with intangible property is identifying comparable uncontrolled
transactions, especially when the intangible is transferred in connection with a transfer of
tangible property or the provision of services.'"*^ Under the regulations an intangible is
"an asset that comprises any of the following items and has substantial value independent








See chapter II.C. for items that falls under the definition of intangible property. Regs. §1.482-4(b) and
Regs. § 1.482-4T(b).
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Four methods are provided to test the arm's-length character of consideration paid
when there has been a transfer of intangible propert>' within the MNE: CUT. CPM. profit
split and unspecified methods. Each of the methods must be applied in accordance
with all of the provisions of § 1.482-1. including the best method rule of § 1.482- 1(c). the
comparability analysis of § 1.482 (d) and the arm's-length range of § 1.482- 1(e).
However, in order to apply the pricing methods, for purposes of Section 482. the
licensee has to acquire an interest in the intangible from a member of the MNE that is
considered to be the '"owner" of the intangible. The owner of a particular intangible is
either the legal owner of the right to exploit the intangible if the intangible is legally
protected (e.g., patents or trademarks), or the developer of the intangible if the intangible
is not legally protected (e.g., know how).''*^ Secondly, there has to be an actual transfer
of the intangible.
a. Transfer ofan Intangible
Two types of transactions have led to disputes between the IRS and taxpayers, as to
whether there has been a transfer of an intangible or not. These transactions are





This type of transaction normally is in the form of a sale of branded products to a
controlled distributor. In the case of an inbound transaction, the IRS tends to see the
buyer as a licensee instead of a distributor, in order to allocate some of the income
attributable to the trademark or trade name to the U.S. The transaction is characterized as
a "transfer" of the trademark. If the foreign owned U.S. distributor have conducted
advertising or marketing expenses the IRS position is that those expenditures are to be
seen as marketing intangibles.'^^
ii. Roundtrip Transactions
This kind of transaction normally involves a license agreement between an U.S.
parent company and a foreign subsidiary, where the subsidiary has the right to use
products or processes to manufacture products that will be sold back to the U.S. parent.
The IRS does not allow income attributable to these products/intangibles to be allocated
to the foreign subsidiar>'. One could classify this behavior as a "transfer out" of
intangibles and a "transfer in" of tangible goods. The IRS's standpoint is that the U.S.
parent would never accept an uncontrolled supplier to gain profits attributable to the
intangible and use it exclusively to supply products back to the U.S. Therefore, the
transaction cannot be at an arm's-length level. However, the IRS has so far not come up
with a successful theory to back up its position in Tax Court litigation.
'*' Mogle, at 14. See Indopco Inc. v. Comr., 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
''° Mogle, at 20.
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The final regulations reject the combining of tangible and intangible transactions
and focus the analysis on whether there has been an actual transfer of intangibles to the
alleged licensee. A precise analysis of the functions performed and risks assumed by the
foreign party is required, and the regulations also state specific rules in determining the
total business risks each party has borne in the transaction.'"^'
The reason for this analysis is to discern between true licensees (i.e., including
rights to exploit the intangible for their own benefit) and other "transferees", which
exercise a more limited use with the purpose of manufacturing products for the
transferor.
'^'^ A true licensee will, apart from the manufacturing of a product, also
conduct various marketing functions connected with certain marketing risks.
In Bausch & Lomb^^^, the U.S. parent (B&L) granted a non-exclusive license to its
Irish subsidiary to manufacture contact lenses using the parents cost-effective
technology. Under the license agreement, the subsidiary was permitted to sell contact
lenses anywhere under B&L's trademark in exchange for a royalty of 5% of their net
sales. The subsidiary used the transferred intangible property to manufacture lenses for
sale in the U.S. market through the parent, which then would act as a distributor. The
arm's length character of the transfer price paid by the parent for the lenses as well as the
royalty rate were at issue. B&L offered no evidence to defend the royalty arrangement
and relied primarily upon its two experts, who concluded 5% was the standard rate.
'"Regs. §1.482-IT(c)(3)(ii).
'"Mogle, at21.
'" Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525 (1989), 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
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The IRS claimed a royalty around 30% to be appropriate. Using a profit-based
method, and rejecting both parties methods, the Court made its own allocation based on
the prospective profits to be realized by the subsidiary'. The arm's-length nature of the
agreement could only be determined by reference to the facts that existed at the time of
the agreement. The court found a 20% royalty, and 27%) of the profits, to be appropriate
in view of the technology the subsidiary gained access to and the low level of risks
assumed.
With respect to the U.S. market, the subsidiary did not perform any marketing
functions, and would therefore under the final regulations not have been seen as a
licensee and consequently not entitled to any of the profits from the U.S. market.
b. Ownership ofan Intangible
In the regulations, ownership can be established under any of four tests: Legal
ownership; Economic ownership; Ownership by agreement; or. Ownership in accordance
to a cost sharing arrangement.'" When members of the same MNE develop an intangible
without an existing cost sharing agreement, the regulations state that only one can be the
developer. The assistant developing company must therefore receive an arm's-length
compensation for the assistance (e.g., loans, services, tangible, or intangible property),
but will not be considered to have an interest in the intangible. '^^ Usually, the company
who had the greatest developing cost of the intangible would be deemed to be the owner.
''•' Mogle, at 22.
'" Mogle, at 8.
'' Regs. §1.482-4(0(3).
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Surprisingly, the final regulations provide, apart from prior regulations, that the
"legal owner'* of the right to exploit the intangible is considered to be the owner
irrespective of the economic reality in a transaction between related parties when we are
dealing with legally protected intangibles. In situations were one party is deemed to own
the trademark but another owns the underlying product design, we have a valuation
problem.''^
When the intangible is not legally protected, the deemed owner will be the company
who bore the greatest part of the development costs, a rule that is fully consistent with
prior regulations. In Ciba -Geigy Corp v. Comr., ' the court recognized that if the party
without legal title made a significant economic contribution in the development of an
intangible, the economic ownership would override the legal title for purposes of Section
482. The case concerned a license agreement, under which an U.S. subsidiary would pay
a 10% royalty to its Swiss parent for an exclusive license to manufacture and sell a
patented product in the U.S. The parent held the legal title to the patents but the IRS
argued that the U.S. company had an economic interest in the patent due to common
R&D. However, due to the lack of evidence, no joint agreement was found to exist. The
court concluded that the parent was the sole developer and the actions taken by the U.S.
subsidiary were normal for a licensee and it therefore owned no economic interest in the
159
patents.
'" Raby, at 97.
'^"gST.C. 172(1985).
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i. Cost Sharing Arrangements
As mentioned earlier, a cost sharing arrangement is an agreement under which the
parties involved agree to share the costs of development of one or more intangibles in
return for an ownership interest in these assets. '^° This arrangement is an alternative to
licensing in exchange of a royalty.
For a cost sharing arrangement to be consistent with the "commensurate with
income" standard, a participant is expected to bear its portion of all research and
development costs. The allocation of costs should generally be proportionate to the profit
as determined before deduction for research and development, and to the extent one
participant begins funding R&D at a much earlier point in time than another participant,
that participant should receive an appropriate return on its investment.'^'
In order for the arrangement not to be subject to allocations under Section 482, it has
to be a "qualified cost sharing arrangement", meaning that the arrangement must:
1
.
include at least two participants;
2. provide a method to calculate each controlled participant's share of the costs;
3. provide for adjustment of that share to account for changes in economic conditions;
and,
4. be recorded in a contemporaneous document that clearly explains all the terms and
conditions of the arrangement.'^^
'" Mogle, at 9.
''°Reg.§1.482-7(a)(l).




If a cost sharing agreement does not exist, only one member can be deemed to be
the owner of the intangible. This determination is based on a consideration of all of the
facts and circumstances. As mentioned earlier, the member with the greatest
development cost is usually considered to be the owner. Transfer pricing problems with
joint development of intangibles do however occur when, for example, a member of a
MNE has fulfilled contract research and development services for other members of the
group. Or, is involved in notable marketing activities in connection with the acquisition
and resale of goods produced by another member of the MNE.'" These issues can be
summarized as follows:
Contract research and development. This kind of development can be structured
in different ways. First, one member develops and owns the intangible and then licenses
it in exchange for a royalty from the other members of the MNE. Secondly, development
through a cost sharing arrangement. Or finally, at least two of the companies within the
MNE enter into a contract research and development arrangement. These different types
of development can produce totally different tax and financial results for the MNE,
depending upon the income tax rates in involved countries and the tax treatment of R&D
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expenses.
The concept of contract research and development arrangements is simple: one
member conducts the research and receives a service fee, normally on a cost plus profit




consequently entitled to all future income, or loss. This arrangement gives an opportunity
of tax planning if the development is located in a low-tax area. Other controversies are
whether an arm's-length fee is paid, and who is the owner of the intangible. There is a
possibility that the country of development wants a piece of the income allocated to the
owner located elsewhere. The taxpayer typically bears the burden of proof to show that
the company executing the R&D was kept away from the financial risk and has been
properly compensated. The most convenient way to do this is of course through a
carefully written agreement between the parties. The final regulations focus on examples
of joint development of marketing intangibles instead of stating a clear policy with
respect to contract R&D. So this is an area that could create controversy.'^"^
Marketing intangibles. The regulations contain a number of examples explaining
the developer rules of marketing intangibles. For example, presume that an U.S.
subsidiary distributes the product of its foreign parent but the brand name is unknown
within the U.S. The subsidiary undertakes advertising etc. to establish the name in the
U.S. but is not directly reimbursed by the parent for the service provided. The example
concludes that since the level of expenses incurred is comparable to those incurred by
uncontrolled distributors of comparable products in the same industry, no reallocation of
the expenses shall be made from the subsidiary to the parent. Consequently, the income
attributable to the use of the trade name in the U.S. belongs to the foreign parent.
'^^
If the level of marketing expenses would exceed those incurred by a comparable
uncontrolled distributor, the fair market value of the marketing activities should be re-
allocated to the foreign parent. The regulations do not take into consideration the transfer
'"Mogle, at 12.
'" Reg. §1.482-4(0(3)(iv), Example 2.
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price for the parent's product before the conclusion that an adjustment should be made
under Section 482. To determine if the distributor really has borne the real economic
burden of developing the trade name, a comparison based on profit margins earned by
uncontrolled distributors executing similar functions shall be made. The gross margin -
established by the transfer price - is supposed to correctly reflect the extraordinary
market development costs incurred to promote the trade name in the U.S.'
^^
If we change the example to include a long-term license agreement, giving the
U.S. subsidiary the sole right to distribute the branded product in the U.S. by transferring
the "ownership" to the right of exploitation of the trademark, an allocation of marketing
expenses is not necessary.
'^^
These examples taken from the regulations have had the effect that any "excess" in
marketing expenses has been allocated to the owner of the intangible by the IRS. But in
reality, there is almost never enough publicly available information from uncontrolled
distributors to make that assumption. Further, by ignoring the transfer price for the
products bought from the parent, the examples do not determine how the costs in fact
were divided between the members of the MNE. If a written agreement does not exist
between the parties that clearly indicates how the ownership of the intangible is
transferred to the subsidiary, it might have been better to treat these examples as transfers
of tangible property.'
'^^Mogle, at 13.
"^^ Reg. §1 .482-4(f)(3)(iv), Example 4.
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c. Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction Method
This method is in fact a version of the CUP method, applicable to intangible property.
When applying the comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) method, two potentially
comparable intangibles must meet two tests:
The Industry or Market test. Comparable intangible property in an uncontrolled
transaction must be used in cormection with similar products or processes, within the
same general industry or market. This is common sense and the test is easy to apply.
The Profit potential test. The intangibles being compared should also have more or
less the same profit potential. Profit potential is ideally measured by the net present value
of the benefits from the intangible based on prospective profits to be realized or costs to
be saved. '^° The capital investment and start-up costs and risks assumed by the transferee
must be taken into consideration when calculating the net present value of the benefits
being realized.' However, more subjective factors may be considered to determine the
profit potential, such as: the terms of the transfer, the stage of development of the
intangible, uniqueness of the property, functions to be performed by the transferor and
transferee. '^^ If sufficient information about profit potential is not available, the CUT
method cannot be applied.
The two main questions under CUT method are whether the stated royalty is an
arm's-length result and if the royalty will be subject to periodic review and adjustment
for tax purposes over the term of the license. The regulations provide that if the license is
"'Mogle, at 14.
"'°Reg. §1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(l).
''' Mogle, at 30.
'^'Reg. §1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2).
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for more than one year, the royahy should fall under the scrutiny of the IRS, unless the
taxpayer falls under the exception to the periodic review rule.'^^
d. Lump Sum Payments
The most common way to transfer intangible property is through a license agreement
in connection with annual royalty payments. But sometimes the intangible is transferred
for a single, lump sum payment paid at the time of the transfer. To determine if the
payment satisfies the arm's-length standard the lump sum is treated as an advance
payment of the annual royalty payments over the term of the agreement or the useful life
of the intangible property. This "equivalent royalty amount" must also meet the
commensurate with income standard and can also be subject to periodic adjustments as
an actual royalty.''''*
e. Periodic Adjustments
If a multi-year arrangement is in action, the consideration charged each year for the
transfer of the intangible may be subject to adjustment - in accordance to the arm's-
length standard - to ensure that it is commensurate with the income attributable to the
intangible.
'^"^




However, there are several exceptions to this requirement, depending upon the
method used to calculate the original transfer price for the intangible. An allocation will
not be made in a subsequent year if, for example:
• The price was determined under the CUT method based on the same intangible. This
exception will be difficult to invoke, because it is not easy finding such a comparable
uncontrolled transaction.
• The price was determined under the CUT method based on a comparable intangible.
This exception is also hard to invoke, because one needs to find the details of a
comparable uncontrolled transaction based on a comparable intangible.'
• The price was determined under a method other than the CUT method, and there is a
written agreement that provided for an amount of consideration with respect to each
taxable year subject to the agreement. To qualify for the exception, the total profits
actually earned or the total cost savings realized by the controlled transferee from
exploitation must not have been less than 80% or more than 120% of the prospective
profits or cost savings that were foreseeable when the controlled agreement was
entered into.'^^
C. Penalties
Section 6662(e) and (h) sets forth penalties of 20 percent (or 40 percent in some
cases) on a portion of underpayment of tax that is attributable to section 482 adjustments.





the arm's-length standard by encouraging (!) taxpayers to make fair efforts to determine
and document arm's-length prices for their intercompany transactions. But if the taxpayer
complies with specified documentation requirements, the rules will not apply to that
extent. The taxpayer must have engaged in some kind of misconduct to trigger the
penalty rules: negligence, disregarding the regulations, or filing substantial
understatement of income tax.'
1 Specified Method Exclusion
Under this exclusion, adjustments are excluded from the "net Section 482
adjustment" calculation (i.e., any collateral adjustments made by the IRS under Section
482, reducing the taxable income, must be taken into account) if the taxpayer satisfies the
specified method - and documentation requirement. The requirements are that the
taxpayer calculated the transfer price under the best method rule and made a reasonable
effort (determined from all facts and circumstances) to evaluate the potential
applicability of the other specified methods.
When determining if the taxpayer choice of method was reasonable, several factors
are relevant, for example:
• The experience and knowledge of the taxpayer. If the taxpayer is a member of a large
MNE, a more thorough and precise analysis is expected.
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Reg. §I.482-4(f)(2)(ii)(C).
'^ McDermott, at 127.
180
Reg. § 1 .6662-6(d)(2).
'*' McDemiott, at 139.
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• The obtaining and analysis of accurate data. The taxpayer shall conduct "a reasonably
thorough search", but the cost of collecting data compared to the dollar amount of the
transaction in question, shall be considered. But, the higher amount of the transaction
under scrutiny, the stronger reason for the taxpayer to perform such a search.
'^^
• The extent to which the taxpayer relied on an analysis made by a qualified
professional, including an attorney, accountant or economist.
• The size of the net transfer pricing adjustment in relation to the size of the controlled
transaction out of which the adjustment arose.
'^^
2. Misstatements
A "substantial valuation misstatement" exists when the transfer price reported equals
200% or more, or 50% or less, of the arm's-length price determined under Section 482. A
"gross valuation misstatement" equals 400% or more, or 25% or less, of the arm's-length
price. The "transactional penalty" under Section 6662(e) or (h) is then imposed, unless
the taxpayer can show "reasonable cause" and "good faith" in the determination of the
reported transfer price.
The penalties do not only apply on transactions deviated from the arm's-length
standard by specified percentage amounts, but also when the overall amount of
adjustments under Section 482 exceeds certain threshold levels.
'*^Reg. §1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(B).
'"^Reg. §1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii).
'*" McDermott, at 128.
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For a substantial valuation misstatement, the threshold is the lesser of $5 million or
10% of the taxpayers gross receipts, and in the case of gross valuation misstatement, the
lesser of $20 million or 20%. This version is called the "net adjustment penalty". '^^ If
these thresholds are met, the taxpayer can avoid the transfer pricing penalty if it can
demonstrate a reasonable basis for believing its transfer price was at an arm's-length
standard. Appropriate documentation must also be turned over to the IRS within 30 days
of a request.
Examples: If the net Section 482 adjustment is $21 million, i.e., a gross valuation
misstatement, a 40 % penalty equal to $3,360,000 ($21 million x 40% (corporate tax
rate) x 40%) will in that case be imposed under Section 6662.
If the adjustment had been $19 million instead of $21 million, there would be a 20%
penalty since the net Section 482 adjustment exceeds $5 million but not $20 million.
Under these circumstances it is necessary to review each specific adjustment under
Section 482 (whether the adjustment is 400% or more, or 25% or less, of the arm's-
length price). If $2 million of the $19 million constitutes a gross valuation misstatement,
the penalty would equal $320,000 to that adjustment, and the remaining $17 million
1 Oil
would be subject to the 20% penalty.
D. Advance Pricing Agreements
A business wishing to reduce the uncertainty concerning IRS approval of its transfer





program, as set out in the revenue procedure 96-53 (1996-2 CB 375). An APA may be an
efficient solution to protect the MNE against Section 482 adjustments and Section
6662(e) penalties. So far. more than 160 businesses have secured protection under this
program from the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel, which covers the future
determination and application of transfer pricing methodologies for certain international
transactions of foreign or domestic taxpayers.
The U.S. was the first country to issue this kind of procedure with binding
agreements relating to the application of the arm's-length standard. Under the program,
the taxpayer proposes a transfer method in connection with data under the best method
rule. The IRS evaluates the APA request, and after a discussion with the taxpayer, both
parties sign a written agreement.
'^^
Substantial information must be provided to the IRS wdth the application (e.g.,
relevant pricing data must be obtained from independent transactions) and the participant
also has to pay a user fee ranging from $5,000 to $25,000. User fees will be returned if
the taxpayer withdraws, or the IRS rejects, an APA request. The taxpayer may even be
required to provide an independent expert at its own expense. '^^
The APA will guarantee that the IRS accepts the results determined by the transfer
pricing method to be in compliance with the arm's-length standard under the terms and
conditions of the APA. The taxpayer also has the option to request a roll back of the APA
methodology to prior years, perhaps to resolve existing audit issues.
'^°
'^^
See. IRS report on application and administration of IRC Section 482, at 38, Daily Tax Report, June 7
(1999).





APAs may be unilateral or bilateral. A unilateral APA is an agreement for a
prospective period of time between the IRS and the taxpayer on the appropriate transfer
pricing method (TPM) for the transactions at issue. But there is no guarantee that the
foreign country's taxing authority will agree upon a chosen TPM.
Finally, if the taxpayer so desires, an attempt will be made to negotiate a bilateral
APA with the treaty country affected by the transfer pricing methodology. A bilateral
APA that combines an agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS with an agreement
between the U.S. and foreign tax authority may avoid potential double taxation. The




IRS report, at 6.
V. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The UK tax authorities are alert to the issue of transfer pricing. In comparison
with the U.S., its transfer pricing legislation is short but also ver>- broad. Some other
notable features are the level of detailed information it requires and that the burden of
proof is placed on the taxpayer. The main object of the legislation is to prevent the export
of profits to other countries through artificial inter-group pricing arrangements. In theory,
the legislation can apply to purely domestic transactions, but not in practice. If two
transactions net off. adjustments can only be made to transactions that have a negative
effect on the UK tax base.'^^
The legislation encompasses transactions between any two bodies of persons
under common control, including partnerships. It also covers the giving of business
facilities of whatever kind, which gives the Inland Revenue the ability to apply the
transfer pricing rules to almost any possible transaction a company could conduct. The
case law in this matter supports that theory, see Ametalco UK v. Comr. (1996). This case
clarified the breadth of the law and made it clear that the legislation covers interest-free
loans between related companies by backing up the phrase "the giving of business
facilities of whatever kind". The Inland Revenue also considers that patent royalties,
management fees and payments for services provided are within the scope of the section.
The legislation specifically refers to individual transactions, and the taxpayers normally
"" Rolf& Casley, Transfer Pricing - An International Guide, International Tax Review, at 89 (1997)
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do not have sufficient resources to plan their transfer pricing in that way. The response
from the Inland Revenue is often to demand a great deal of information.'^^
Another important decision is the Glaxo '* case, in which several members of the
Glaxo group had many years of open assessments as a result of unresolved appeals. The
tax authorities suspected non arm's-length transactions within the MNE and the ruling
held that transfer pricing adjustments could be made to any open assessment. In practice,
this threat of assessments place a great burden of proof on the taxpayer in a very early
stage in an inquiry.
'^^
The Inland Revenue upholds the arm's-length principle as described in the OECD
guidelines - it played a significant role in the drafting of the 1995 report - with the
preference of transaction based methods over profit methods. Naturally, the OECD
chapter on documentation will apply in full extent. The regulations prepared by the IRS
under Section 482 can not, of course, have more than a possibly persuasive authority in
the United Kingdom. The Inland Revenue has even obtained a commercial database of
UK companies results to support their position in an investigation when testing the
taxpayers transfer pricing policy.
The Inland Revenue has further been granted wide powers of investigation in its
investigations, divided into three broad categories. First, it can require any company to
supply ''particulars" of any other transaction they might find be of relevance in any other
case of investigation. Secondly, it has the power to require a parent company, resident in
the UK, to supply relevant information belonging to any other non-resident member of
the same MNE. Finally, it can even authorize an inspector to enter premises used in trade
'^^ Rolfe & Casley, at 87-88.
''' Glaxo Group Ltd and others v. Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (1995).
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in order to find useful information. In combination with provisions in double tax treaties
requesting information from other tax authorities, the investigation powers are increased
196
even more.
"^ Rolfe & Casley, at 90.
196
See Tax Management, Business Operations in tiie United Kingdom, at 4-5, May (1999).
VI. BEHIND THE LEGISLATION
How is Section 482 working out- in actual practice? Until March 1999, 12
taxpayers involving 26 tax years have had penalty recommendations approved by the
National Office's Transfer Pricing Committee, the IRS's current administration of the
penalty rules. The basis for penalties have included the total absence of documentation,
inadequate economic analysis or unreasonable result or delay by the taxpayer in
gathering requested documentation. The standards for the imposition of a penalty have
however been quite high. But, the penalty is an issue in practice, and will probably be
proposed more frequently when the taxpayers audit cycles become more current. The
IRS has been working with taxpayers in recent years to bring audit cycles more current.
However, penalties are not being used as bargaining chips to force settlements in transfer
pricing disputes.
'^'
The level of documentation is another source of disagreement, and the IRS will
probably demand more comprehensive background documentation within a shorter time
frame in the future than the taxpayer finds reasonable. But transfer pricing
documentation is more or less already a part of the routine tax compliance of MNEs and
the regulations also provide a standard format for documentation, see Reg. §1.6662-
6(d)(2)(iii). The standpoint from the IRS is that they are also entitled to the inquiry that
led to the conclusions in the documentation. The documentation requirement may be
'" See, Real World of Transfer Pricing Today, TAXES, at 168, March (1999).
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solved easiest by use one set of advisers to plan a transfer pricing system and another that
prepares the documentation that the IRS wants.
'^^
Another important topic is the '"commensurate with income"' standard (a.k.a. the
"super royalty rule", amended in 1986), entitling the IRS to take into account facts not
available to the taxpayer at the time the, license was installed in order to sustain an
adjustment of the royalty rate. Two specific problems can be recognized: absence of
comparable uncontrolled transactions involving high profit intangibles and uncertainty of
the profit potential in beforehand. The IRS recognized the criticism in the final
regulations that the commensurate with income standard is meant to be subordinate to the
arm's-length standard, with the function to prevent obvious misapplications.'^^
The IRS has however taken aggressive positions in royalty cases (asserting its
"contract manufacturer theory"), and it remains to be seen if the courts will follow the
intended purpose of the standard or not. The best defense against aggressive application
of the commensurate with standard is to base the royalty rates on comparable arm's-
length transactions combined with the advantage of the safe harbors against periodic
adjustments. ^^° Another approach could be to contractually divide the risks within the
MNE.
There are some attempts within the IRS and the APA program to develop what is
called an economic return method. It relies on the economic principle that the transferor
and the transferee both want to recover their costs related to the development or the use
''"Mat 169-170.
''Mat 171-172.
"°° No periodic adjustments will be made if the royalty rate is supported by a comparable third-party
license for the same intangible or if the profits from that license are within 20% of the planned profits.
Reg§1.482-4(0(2)(ii).
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of the intangible. The method asks the following question: "What is the most a licensee
would pay to an unrelated licensor for this intangible under given circumstances?"
An analysis is made under the method to: estimate cash flow over the term of the
license; translate future earnings into present value; and finally, to subtract the licensee's
initial investment from the present value of the cash flow to determine the investments
net present value. In theory, the licensee would not pay more than resulted in zero net
present value. The conclusion made from this approach is that IRS basically thinks that
the licensee should pay back all the income above its return of initial investment as a
royalty. The licensee would not be entitled extra compensation for functions performed
or risks assumed and all of the residual income could potentially flow back to the
licensor.'^^'
The APA program is rather popular and other countries besides the U.S. are
participating more often. But the program is not for all taxpayers unless it is almost
certain to come under the IRS scrutiny. The program should be seen as one of several
available forums for resolving transfer pricing issues but is especially beneficiary if the
taxpayer is already subject to transfer pricing examination. In some cases an agreement
can cover up to ten years and the savings can be great. Under the traditional approach the
transfer pricing process is a complex process that can take up to eight or more years to
resolve.
^°^
From the examiners side an APA agreement may be preferable in order to resolve
difficult issues. It is definitely more cost effective, the average cost of an APA is less
than $72,000. The APA process has a couple of other advantages, even though
^'" TAXES, at 173, March (1999).
^°- IRS report, at 36.
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negotiations can be hard and contentious: First, it is quicker than the traditional approach
(i.e., examination. Appeals. Counsel and perhaps even all the to competent authority).
Secondly, the process might add new personnel, hopefully with a fresh perspective, that
has not already worked on the issue for a long time. The APA process probably is most
effective before a serious conflict has surfaced and when the underlying issue is not too
controversial, as high-value intangibles.
-"^ TAXES, at 175-177.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Comparison US/OECD
Both the U.S. regulations and the Guidehnes determine the arm's-length price in an
intercompany transaction by comparing either prices or profits of that controlled
transaction to conditions present in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Factors that
have to be comparable: functions performed, contractual terms, risks assumed, and the
characteristics of the property or service transferred or provided. To determine the degree
of comparability, a functional analysis is performed to identify the economically
significant functions in the transaction.
The extent of comparability that can be demanded under the U.S. regulations is
probably a great source for disputes in the future. The more narrow definition from the
IRS of the standard of comparability in the regulations, the harder for the taxpayer to
show that the arm's-length standard support their transfer pricing. But the standpoint
from the IRS is that the regulations flexibly recognize that comparability need not be
exact, but the uncontrolled transaction must be sufficiently similar to provide a reliable
arm's-length result.
MNEs have to accept the fact that transfer pricing most certainly will acquire more
and more of their time and efforts and increase their tax exposure when various tax
authorities fight over their revenue. They have to clearly demonstrate that their
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transactions are at an arm's-length level. Their defense against suspicious scrutiny is
easiest done with the help of extensive and well-planned documentation in combination
with an economic analysis of all risks and functions within the MNE.
The focus on legal ownership of an intangible in the U.S. regulations for purposes of
Section 482 is not consistent with economic reality. Forcing "tax ownership" of an
intangible to follow legal ownership creates a conflict between tax planning and legal
strategies. Many MNEs believe that trademarks and trade names should be registered in
the name of the parent, while others think that their intangibles are better protected if
registered on the "using" company, quite often a foreign subsidiary. The income created
by the intangible will be allocated to the legal owner independent of the development
costs.
The OECD guidelines have chosen to focus on the importance of economic
ownership over legal ownership, which seems to be a more appropriate approach. This
difference could in fact expose taxpayers to the risk of double taxation, apart from
causing controversies between the U.S. and its major trading partners.
B. CPM & TNMM
The final U.S. regulations tried to reduce the significance of CPM by requiring a
higher level of comparability. Consequently, differences in business experience, cost
structure and the efficiency of the management have to be taken into account. The
operating rules for the TNMM in the guidelines are in fact practically the same.
Important to note is that the guidelines do not prohibit the use of CPM, even though
some OECD members have rejected the use of the method, especially Germany.
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If the two methods are appHed properly, they should produce the same result even if
the TNMM require a transactional basis approach. The TNMM appears not to be suited
for identifying net profits or intended for use on a transaction-by-transaction basis. The
CPM may be a useful approach in the U.S., but may not be accepted outside the border
especially if the result seems to favor the U.S. business.
Despite the best method rule, there is no secret that the IRS mostly bases its decisions
of an APA agreement upon the CPM, and that it is the preferred method. It has even
stated that the cost plus and resale price hardly ever is used because lack of appropriate
external data.
C. The Future of Transfer Pricing
1 Intangible Property
Those who control intangible property will have the economic dominance in the
future. In international mergers a lot of money is already being paid for trademarks, trade
names or patents, just to name a few intangibles. In other words, the question of were to
develop intangibles, if the use of cost sharing or licensing is to be applied, in connection
with the valuation of intangibles will be important areas within transfer pricing. That
goes for complexity as well as tax exposure. From being an area dominated by legal
experts arguing over the interpretation of abstract and vague rules, it is likely to be
dominated by economists performing functional analysis based on economic data and
valuation of risks assumed and functions performed.
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The economic return method does not require any detailed information from
comparables and the IRS is in fact trying to develop this method for publication in the
Internal Revenue Manual as an audit tool for examiners. The challenging of royalty rates
is probably one of the largest areas of examination right now.
Cost sharing arrangements should be respected by the IRS if conducted consistently,
but the problem is that these arrangements usually start after one party has developed
valuable intangibles. Therefore, one party will pay a royalty for a pre-existing intangible.
Determining the level of "buy in" royalty will in fact present most of the difficult issues
that can be found when deciding arm's-length royalty. High-tech companies involved in
cross-border licensing to affiliates will have to produce extensive documentation to
defend its transfer pricing policy.
2. Exchange of Information
Another issue is the rapid development of information technology and globalization
of business. The traditional system of allocating the profits from single transactions to
specific jurisdictions for taxation has to change due to the increasing use of globalized
computer systems, which makes it almost impossible to trace back deals to specific sales
persons. The term permanent establishment may not be useful as a means of defining the
taxation rights of specific tax authorities.
The struggle for tax revenues between individual nations may be carried out between
political and economic blocs in the next millenium. These developments will most
certainly lead to a major increase in competent authority procedures as well in the use of
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bilateral and multilateral APA's to safeguard their taxpayers from double taxation. The
tax authorities need to cooperate even more and increase the exchange of information.
From the IRS"s point of view, the implication of the Internet and electronic
commerce does not present any different transfer pricing issues compared to other kinds
of business. The IRS still must evaluate the arm's-length results of functions performed
and risks assumed in domestic and foreign tax jurisdictions.
U.S. customs already provides the IRS with import data in conjunction with specific
examinations as well as sharing developments in software, which helps the IRS to save
both time and money. But there are so far no customs data for imported or exported
services and intangibles, areas in which transfer pricing controversies flourish.
3. APA
As the IRS and the taxpayers in the U.S. have become more used to the APA
process, so has the world. The program is receiving increased acceptance by many of the
U.S. treaty partners, including the United Kingdom and Japan. Almost half of the closed
APAs are bilateral, and the OECD is currently finalizing guidelines for bilateral APAs,
which will probably lead to a broader acceptance among the member countries. There is
however some 'action' around the program:
In January the IRS reversed its long-time position that APA documents were
confidential information protected by section 6103. Instead, they stated that it was seen
to be written determinations and should be made public in redacted form, parts of which
should be disclosed to the public under Section 61 10. The date for releasing the APAs is
scheduled October 18 1999. As a response, a number of trade groups seeking a way
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around the IRS's decision to release APA agreements have taken their fight to Congress.
asking the lawmakers to enact legislation that would protect this information from
disclosure. The groups said this legislation is needed to assure that the APA program will
remain robust and effective. An argument in favor for releasing the documents could be
that if the APA's were placed outside the public eye, an elite group would be created
with their own ''secret law".
This issue is interesting and a group of tax experts has begun working on legislation
to bar access to the agreements. The controversy stems from a three-year-old litigation
filed by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (BNA) in which they state that redacted
APA information is subject to disclosure under Section 6110 and the Freedom of
Information Act. The IRS is interested in protecting the APA program, BNA wants a
disclosure, and the taxpayer is opposed to disclosure but not represented in court. The
best way for taxpayers to prevent disclosure of confidential business information might
be a combination of intervention and legislation.
How are treaty partners with whom the U.S. has negotiated APA's reacting to this
issue? Canadian officials have expressed concern about protecting sensitive information
about Canadian firms, and some other treaty partners have expressed concern about the
lawsuit when negotiating bilateral APA's. The OECD has so far not prepared comments




According to an independent study, large MNEs avoided paying $35.6 billion in
income in 1998. by using transfer pricing. The study showed the following figures, for
example: Ice Cream is exported to the Cayman Islands for 20 cents by kilogram and laser
printers for $50 each to Mexico. Consequently, by lowering the price, the U.S. based
company shows no profit. The IRS is not as pessimistic, but concludes in its recently
released report on transfer pricing, that the annual gross tax gap due to noncompliance
with Section 482 is $2.8 billion.
The solution to this revenue loss may not be to rewrite the legislation, but to
negotiate changes in tax treaties or to give the OECD more power. Another approach
could be the transfer to a formula approach instead of using the arm's-length standard.
The formula approach uses mathematical formulas to assign income on a geographical
basis. It compares property, payroll and sales of a particular country against those same
values wherever the business operates. A change to a formula approach is however not
likely to happen in the near future. The U.S. has helped build an international consensus,
as a member of the OECD, in favor of the arm's-length standard and all of its income tax
treaties contain articles requiring mutual application of the arm's-length standard to
resolve transfer pricing disputes.
Additionally, many of the U.S. major trading partners have amended their domestic
laws governing transfer pricing to incorporate the arm's-length principle, and put into




The United Kingdom has for years been reflecting on how to respond to the
introduction of documentation and penahy rules in the U.S. It is now updating its transfer
pricing regime and issues similar rules itself. Apart from adopting formal documentation
rules, the UK is also expanding its own APA program in order to deal with potential
controversies. Although the UK tax authorities have concluded few bilateral APAs. and
those are mostly with the U.S.. their intention is clearly to increase that number in the
future. However, the UK Inland Revenue has gained a reputation for vigorous
investigations of company transfer pricing affairs, and UK companies can expect changes
in the law that puts a greater burden of compliance from their side.
6. Japan
The most recent news from Japan is that the Tax Administration will limit its use of
confidential third-party information in transfer pricing audits, especially in situations
when the taxpayer is uncooperative. Further, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industr)' calls for a more developed international harmonization of transfer pricing
methodologies, and points to the need for a new international body for arbitration of
unrelated transfer pricing disputes between nations.
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